The Returns to Nonmarket Strategies During Institutional Transitions: Investor Reactions to Actor and Tie Characteristics
研究制度转型期间投资者如何评估企业非市场策略的合法性，发现与制度转型一致的行动者（如NGO）和关系（如捐赠）能带来更高价值，而不一致（如政治董事会关系）则损害企业价值。
We explain how investor perceptions of nonmarket strategies’ legitimacy, and thereby value, change during institutional transitions toward greater legal compliance. Indirect influence strategies should be better aligned with the transition and therefore become more legitimate than those associated with direct co-optation and control. Moreover, investors should assess this alignment based on two defining characteristics of firms’ nonmarket strategies, namely, the nonmarket actors and the ties involved. We, therefore, expect investors to value firms’ ties to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) more than to political actors and ties formed via donations more than board ties. We test our hypotheses in the context of seven police raids that took place in Brazil in 2014; these raids launched “Operation Car Wash,” an anticorruption probe that signaled to investors a shift toward greater legal compliance at that point in time. Ultimately, we find that firms benefited the most when both nonmarket actors and ties were aligned with the institutional transition (i.e., NGO donations), and they suffered the most when both characteristics were misaligned (i.e., political board ties). Our findings integrate nonmarket strategies’ political and social facets by showing how actor and tie characteristics jointly explain their success or failure. They also contribute to explaining which firms will be better positioned to weather institutional transitions between legal capture and legal compliance. Funding: This work was supported by Getúlio Vargas Pesquisa-Fundação Getúlio Vargas; Govil Family Faculty Scholar Award; Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1616 .