When does analyst reputation matter? Evidence from analysts’ reliance on management guidance
研究了分析师声誉、不确定性和指引消息性质如何共同影响分析师对管理层指引的依赖程度，发现高声誉分析师在不确定性高或指引为好消息时更少依赖指引，且这种低依赖虽牺牲准确性但提升信息含量和职业前景。
Abstract We investigate the joint effects of analyst reputation, uncertainty and guidance news valence on analysts’ reliance on management guidance. We find that, compared to less reputable analysts, reputable analysts rely less on guidance when they issue earnings forecasts. This analyst reputation effect is stronger when earnings and information uncertainty are higher or when the guidance contains good news. Further analysis suggests that both reputable and less reputable analysts sacrifice their forecast accuracy when they rely less on guidance; however, reputable analysts are compensated to a greater extent by the increased informativeness of their forecasts. Finally, we find that analysts’ future career advancement is enhanced when their reliance is low.