When Does Higher Firm Leverage Lead to Higher Employee Pay?
研究发现，新入职员工因企业杠杆率提高而获得更高工资，以补偿财务困境风险；但老员工工资不受影响，且工资成本取决于员工流动率、增长计划和当地劳动力市场状况。
Abstract We show that newly hired workers earn higher wages in response to higher firm leverage. Consistent with compensating differential models, these higher wages appear to reflect compensation for the risk of earnings losses in the event of financial distress. For tenured workers, increases in leverage are not associated with higher wages. Our findings suggest that the wage costs of debt and optimal capital structure for a firm depend on expected employee turnover, as well as on the firm’s future growth and hiring plans. Variation in local labor market conditions also significantly affects the relationship between firm leverage and employee pay. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.