Labor unions and post‐acquisition integration capability: Evidence from goodwill impairment
研究发现工会带来的经营僵化会阻碍并购后资源重新配置，导致企业无法实现商誉中的预期协同效应，从而增加商誉减值的可能性和规模。
Abstract We examine whether operating inflexibility posed by labor unions affects goodwill impairment. We predict such inflexibility hinders resource reallocation after acquisition, thereby preventing the acquiring firm from realizing synergies included in goodwill. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the strength of labor unions is positively associated with the likelihood and magnitude of goodwill impairment losses. Our results are robust to a battery of tests that address the potential endogeneity. Furthermore, we find that managers who possess superior ability mitigate the negative consequences of labor unions on goodwill impairment. Overall, our findings suggest that operating inflexibility posed by labor unions is an important determinant of goodwill impairment that indicates a failure to realize the expected synergy from the acquisition.