比较一次性博弈中脱离实验处理的理论

Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment

Journal of Economic Theory · 2022
被引 4
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

收集了多种两人两策略和三策略一次性博弈数据,提出新方法比较不同理论在脱离实验处理时的预测能力,发现考虑风险厌恶能显著提升预测效果,但没有任何理论在所有情况下都最优。

Abstract

We collected data on one-shot play for a representative selection of two-player two- and three-strategy games with unique and completely mixed strategy predictions and propose a new method to compare theories of one-shot play “out of treatment” that allows a direct likelihood comparison: Competing theories are calibrated with pre-existing data using different games and subjects. Most theories in most treatments have predictive power. No theory is uniformly best. Considering risk aversion significantly improves predictive power. Nash equilibrium with risk aversion is among the best predictors of play in four of six treatment groups: the exceptions are the behavior of individuals in the asymmetric own-payoff player positions in games of a matching pennies and rock-scissors-paper variety.

一次性博弈理论比较博弈策略预测风险厌恶纳什均衡