Analyst independence and earnings management
研究发现分析师独立性越强，公司盈余管理程度越低；2003年全球研究分析师和解协议强制支持独立研究机构后，受影响公司的盈余管理显著减少，但支持结束后效果消失。
Abstract We examine whether analyst independence contributes to analysts’ monitoring role in deterring accruals earnings management. We first report a negative association between earnings management and the ratio of independent analysts to brokerage analysts covering a firm. Next, through the lens of the promotion of independent sell‐side research institutions by the 2003 Global Research Analyst Settlement, we document a significant decrease in earnings management on firms affected by the Global Settlement's mandate for time‐limited support to back independent research institutions. Additionally, we find that, as the aforementioned support ended, the extent of monitoring effectiveness reverted to a level indistinguishable from that before the Global Settlement. Finally, using closures and mergers of independent research institutions as a quasi‐natural experiment, we provide corroborating evidence consistent with analyst independence leading to more effective monitoring.