Information Coordination: Does Preannouncement Media Coverage Improve Earnings Expectations?*
研究媒体报道在盈利公告前如何通过协调机构投资者和财务分析师的信息活动，改善盈利预期并加速价格发现，发现预告前媒体报道与公告期间价格重估负相关。
ABSTRACT This study examines whether and how media coverage improves price discovery before earnings announcements. Given the broad reach and timeliness of media coverage, understanding its role in forming earnings expectations is important. I posit that the media specialize in searching for and screening news, while institutional investors and financial analysts specialize in interpreting and integrating information. I expect these coordinated efforts to improve earnings expectations and preempt upcoming earnings announcements. Consistent with this prediction, I find (i) preannouncement media coverage is negatively associated with price revaluations during earnings announcements, (ii) preannouncement media coverage is positively associated with institutional investors' information acquisition and financial analysts' forecast frequency, and (iii) institutional information acquisition and analyst forecast activity are two mechanisms by which media coverage preempts upcoming earnings. My main results are robust to short‐window tests and identification concerns. Overall, my findings suggest that media coverage coordinates information efforts and accelerates the incorporation of information in prices, facilitating preannouncement price discovery.