Attraction versus competition: A tale of two similarity effects in director selection of Chinese firms
研究中国上市公司董事长选拔董事时，政治背景相似会降低被选概率（竞争逻辑），而技术背景相似则提高被选概率（吸引逻辑），并探讨了相似性内部异质性的调节作用。
Abstract Extant research has focused primarily on the collaborative side of chair-director similarity in director selection, whereas the potential competitive side remains underexplored. Emphasizing the dual role of directors as both collaborators and competitors, as perceived by chairs, we incorporate both the similarity-attraction logic and the similarity-competition logic in director selection and develop a collaborative-competitive framework to reconcile the tension between them. Based on new director selection data from Chinese listed firms, we find that chair-director similarity in the competitive-oriented political background is negatively related to the likelihood of the director being selected—consistent with the similarity-competition logic, whereas chair-director similarity in the collaborative-oriented technological background is positively related to the likelihood of the director being selected—consistent with the similarity-attraction logic. Furthermore, we reveal how the similarity-derived effects are contingent on within-similarity heterogeneity. Our study advances research on director selection by providing a more fine-grained understanding of chair-director similarity in director selection.