Price Uncertainty and Debt Covenants: Evidence from U.S. Oil Producers
研究价格不确定性如何影响美国石油生产商在贷款和债券中使用契约条款，发现不确定性增加贷款中的绩效契约，但减少债券中的契约使用，且低代理冲突企业驱动后者，债券投资者要求更高利差补偿。
Abstract We use an exogenous, forward-looking measure of price uncertainty to examine the effect of uncertainty on the use of covenants in private and public debt contracts. The effect of uncertainty differs significantly in loans versus bonds, suggesting that private and public lenders face different incentives when contracting under high uncertainty. In loans, uncertainty increases the use of performance-based covenants. In contrast, covenant usage decreases in bonds, but firms with low agency conflicts mainly drive this effect. However, bondholders require higher spreads to offset the lack of protection with fewer covenants. Hedging does not affect the covenant-uncertainty relationship for debt contracts.