The elusive relation between pension discount rates and deficits
指出固定收益型养老金折现率与资金状况的关系比表面复杂，现有估计存在偏差。基于英国数据，发现养老金发起人不仅用折现率选择减少报告赤字，也减少报告盈余。
Abstract The relation between defined‐benefit (DB) pension discount rates and funding status is more complex than it might first appear. Existing evidence suffers from estimation biases that make precise inference unreliable. We document the biases and quantify their impact on inference in relation to corporate window‐dressing of DB funding status. Our empirical evidence from the United Kingdom suggests that pension sponsors use discretion in the choice of pension discount rate not only to reduce reported deficits but also to reduce reported surpluses.