Money and Politics: The Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Entry and Competition
利用巴西市长选举的支出限制改革，发现更严格的限制降低了连任率、增加了政治竞争，吸引了更不富裕且更少依赖自筹资金的候选人，但短期内未显著改善教育、健康等政策结果。
This paper studies the effects of campaign spending limits on the political entry, selection, and behavior of local politicians in Brazil. We analyze a reform that limits campaign spending for mayoral elections. The limits were implemented with a discontinuity that we exploit for causal identification. We find that stricter limits reduce reelection rates and increase political competition by attracting more candidates who are also less wealthy and rely less on self-financing. Despite their effects on electoral outcomes, stricter limits did not lead to significant short-run improvements in policy outcomes, such as in education and health.