Getting the Price Right? The Impact of Competitive Bidding in the Medicare Program
研究了美国医疗保险耐用医疗设备的竞争性招标项目，发现引入不完善的招标机制后，持续气道正压通气设备支出下降47.2%，主要源于44.8%的价格降低，而需求量仅下降4.3%。
Abstract We study Medicare’s competitive bidding program for durable medical equipment. We use Medicare claims data to examine the effect on prices and utilization, focusing on continuous positive airway pressure devices for sleep apnea. We find that spending falls by 47.2% after a highly imperfect bidding mechanism is introduced. This is almost entirely driven by a 44.8% price reduction, though quantities also fall by 4.3%. To disentangle supply and demand, we leverage differential cost sharing across Medicare recipients. We measure a demand elasticity of -0.272 and find that quantity reductions are concentrated among less clinically appropriate groups.