Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers
研究了在反复反馈的高强度锦标赛激励制度中，管理者如何持续表现出过度自信，并发现他们存在对过去表现的正向记忆偏差，且两者在个体层面相关。
A long-standing puzzle is how overconfidence can persist in settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using reduced form and structural methods we find that (i) managers make over-confident predictions about future performance; (ii) managers have overly positive memories of past performance; (iii) the two phenomena are linked at an individual level. Our results are consistent with models of motivated beliefs in which individuals are motivated to distort memories of feedback and preserve unrealistic expectations.