Demagogues and the Economic Fragility of Democracies
研究民主国家中，代表选民长期利益的远见者与迎合短期欲望的煽动者之间的选举竞争，发现年轻或贫穷经济体及经济弱势选民易被煽动者的投资削减政策吸引，可能导致资本低于临界值并引发民主崩溃的死亡螺旋。
We investigate the susceptibility of democracies to demagogues, studying tensions between representatives who guard voters’ long-run interests and demagogues who cater to voters’ short-run desires. Parties propose consumption and investment. Voters base choices on current-period consumption and valence shocks. Younger/poorer economies and economically disadvantaged voters are attracted to the demagogue’s disinvestment policies, forcing farsighted representatives to mimic them. This electoral competition can destroy democracy: if capital falls below a critical level, a death spiral ensues with capital stocks falling thereafter. We identify when economic development mitigates this risk and characterize how the death-spiral risk declines as capital grows large.