Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium
用主权违约模型研究财政规则，发现债务刹车和利差刹车在基准校准下效果相似，但在异质性经济体联盟中，共同利差刹车优于共同债务刹车，且放弃共同债务刹车可能有益，而放弃共同利差刹车则有害。
We study fiscal rules using a sovereign default model. A debt-brake (spread-brake) rule imposes a ceiling on the fiscal deficit when the sovereign debt (spread) is above a threshold. For our benchmark calibration, similar gains can be achieved with the optimal debt or spread brake. However, for a “Union” of heterogeneous economies, a common spread brake generates larger gains than a common debt brake. Furthermore, gains from abandoning a common debt brake may be significant for economies that are unnecessarily constrained by the rule. In contrast, abandoning a common spread brake would generate losses for any economy in the Union.