Expectations-Driven Liquidity Traps: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
研究新凯恩斯模型中由信心下降引发的流动性陷阱，发现提高通胀目标等常见政策会加剧通缩，而任命对政府支出稳定关注度较低的政策制定者可消除此类陷阱。
We study optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents’ confidence give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. Insights from widely studied fundamental-driven liquidity traps are not a useful guide for enhancing welfare in this model. Raising the inflation target, appointing an inflation-conservative central banker, or allowing for the use of government spending as an additional stabilization tool can exacerbate deflationary pressures and demand deficiencies during the liquidity trap episodes. However, appointing a policy-maker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society eliminates expectations-driven liquidity traps.