Volatility of Tax Payments and Dividend Payouts*
研究发现纳税波动性越大的公司越不可能支付股利，且支付金额也更低，这种关系在用于缓解代理冲突的股利支付中较弱。
ABSTRACT Dividends are a key mechanism for shareholders to discipline managers and mitigate agency conflicts. This study examines whether the volatility of tax payments is associated with dividend payouts. Consistent with the predictions, results suggest that firms with more volatile tax payments are less likely to pay dividends overall and their dividends are lower in magnitude when doing so. These effects are economically significant and incremental to a firm's operating risk. The link between volatile tax payments and the likelihood of dividend payouts is weaker for firms that distribute dividends to alleviate agency conflicts. Similarly, the link between volatile tax payments and the amount of dividend payouts is weaker for firms that hold more cash for tax reasons. Taken together, these findings add to our understanding of the economic consequences of volatile tax payments and the determinants of dividend payouts.