The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods
提出一种针对差异化商品的静态密封投标拍卖，允许竞标者同时投标多种资产，卖方选择供应函数，相比多场单独拍卖或同步多轮拍卖，能提高效率、收入、信息量和交易量，且更简单、不易合谋。该设计源于2007年北岩银行挤兑事件，用于帮助英格兰银行应对信贷紧缩，2008年美国财政部曾计划用类似设计购买“有毒资产”，也可用于电力采购。
I describe a new static (sealed-bid) auction for differentiated goods—the "Product-Mix Auction." Bidders bid on multiple assets simultaneously, and bid-takers choose supply functions across assets. The auction yields greater efficiency, revenue, information, and trade than running multiple separate auctions. It is also often simpler to use and understand, and less vulnerable to collusion, than a simultaneous multiple round auction. I designed it after the 2007 Northern Rock bank run to help the Bank of England fight the credit crunch; in 2008 the U.S. Treasury planned using a related design to buy "toxic assets"; it may be used to purchase electricity.