The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy
研究中央银行在承诺和相机抉择下内生选择控制程度和透明度程度，发现相机抉择下最大控制是唯一均衡，而承诺下耐心且低通胀偏好的银行会选择最低透明度，因此最大控制与最低透明度的组合是可能结果。
We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. We argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency. For the choice of control, under discretion maximum degree of control is the only equilibrium. For the choice of transparency, under commitment, a sufficiently patient bank with sufficiently low average inflation bias will always choose minimum transparency. Thus, a maximum feasible degree of control with a minimum degree of transparency is a likely outcome. The Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System are, arguably, examples of this.