Experimental Auctions with Securities
实验研究了债务和股权投标拍卖，发现债务拍卖因过度投标产生更高收入，而第二价格股权拍卖产生更多剩余，且非正式拍卖中买方更常使用股权。
Abstract We experimentally implement security-bid auctions, which are used around the world to sell projects that generate large, stochastic future cash flows. Buyers make bids with debt and equity, linking payments to the project’s ex-post revenue. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, we find that debt auctions generate more revenue than equity auctions. This is explained by overbidding in debt auctions. Furthermore, we find that second-price equity auctions generate slightly more surplus than other treatments. We also implement informal auctions and find that buyers use equity more often than theory predicts, and that sellers successfully choose dominant bids.