Disguising ‘Taking Money Out of a Firm’: Disconnection and Detrimental Consequences for Workers
本文通过四个案例研究，揭示投资者所有者经理如何利用管理会计策略，在轻触监管下从公司抽走资金，从而损害工人利益。
‘Disconnected capitalism’ is a thesis defined and developed in Work, Employment and Society. This article contributes to the sociology of work by further developing the thesis both theoretically and empirically. The article does so by specifying how accounting practices enable investor-owner managers to take money out of firms with detrimental consequences for workers. Empirically, this development of the thesis is based on four case studies where the theoretical and empirical contributions add to the thesis by highlighting a contemporary dialectic in light-touch regulation that is illustrated by these studies. The article is important because the further development of the thesis provides an analytical device that illustrates how investor-owner managers take advantage of moral hazard provisions in light-touch regulation enacted by the state to deliberately exploit and strategize these provisions through management accounting strategies.