Rating Agency Fees: Pay to Play in Public Finance?
研究发现在市政债券市场中，评级机构费用与信用评级存在扭曲关系，费用异常高的评级更可能被下调，费用低的则更可能被上调，且这一现象主要由失去AAA保险的发行人驱动。
Abstract We examine the relationship between credit rating levels and rating agency fees in a public finance market in which rating agencies earn lower fees and face higher disclosure requirements relative to corporate bond and structured finance markets. Controlling for variation in the complexity of credit analysis at the issue level, we find evidence that rating agency conflicts of interest distort credit ratings in the municipal bond market. Unexpectedly expensive ratings are more likely downgraded, and inexpensive ratings are more likely upgraded. The relationship between credit ratings and rating agency fees is driven by issuers who lose access to AAA insurance.