Symmetry in the Delegation of Power as a Legitimacy Criterion
提出以权力委托的对称性作为评估欧盟合法性的新标准，通过分析欧洲边境体制发现欧盟在边境控制上权力大但在移民政策上权力小，这种不对称导致其无法承担道德责任，构成新的合法性挑战。
Abstract The EU's power is expanding, calling for reassessments of its normative legitimacy. This article proposes a novel criterion for assessing the EU's legitimacy: symmetry in the delegation of power. We illustrate the usefulness of this criterion through an analysis of the European border regime. Existing analyses of the border regime have tended to dismiss it as weak and intergovernmental. We show, to the contrary, that it is both strong and weak. The EU wields significant power in border control but lacks power altogether in immigration policy . This asymmetry has rendered the EU incapable of discharging the moral responsibilities that arise in migration control, posing a novel legitimacy challenge. Finally, we argue that the symmetry criterion generalizes and can shed light on the EU's legitimacy beyond the area of migration.