Inefficient Screening in Online Rental Markets*
研究了在线租房市场中房东筛选房客的行为，发现这种筛选导致过多拒绝并降低福利，但在房东足够多或低效交易损失大时反而能提高福利。
We study a home rental market where hosts compete in prices and decide which guests to accept. Such screening results in inefficiently many rejections and can reduce welfare. In a unique symmetric equilibrium, hosts randomize over prices so that it may be unprofitable for them to accept some efficient trades. Moreover, every equilibrium is inefficient when there are few hosts. We further show that screening increases welfare when there are enough hosts or when the potential loss of surplus from inefficient trades is high. We discuss the implications of our findings to online platforms such as Airbnb and HomeAway.