Agency Cost of Debt and Inside Debt: The Role of CEO Overconfidence
研究了CEO过度自信如何影响内部债务激励（养老金和递延补偿），发现过度自信的CEO有更强的内部债务激励，尤其在债务代理成本高的公司中更明显。
Abstract This study extends our understanding of CEO inside debt compensation under an agency problem perspective by considering the impact of a behavioural trait, namely CEO overconfidence. Using a sample of US firms in Standard & Poor's ExecuComp for the period 2006–2019, we find that overconfident CEOs exhibit greater inside debt incentives (i.e. incentives arising from defined‐benefit pensions and deferred compensation). This relationship is more pronounced among firms with higher CEO overconfidence‐induced agency cost of debt (e.g. financially unconstrained firms) managed by CEOs who are less able to align compensation with their own preferences (e.g. less powerful CEOs). The results are robust to endogeneity, self‐selection concerns and alternative explanations. We contribute to the inside compensation literature that deals with agency problems under overconfident CEOs, and optimal contracting and managerial power theories.