Regulatory Spillovers in Local Mortgage Markets
研究发现《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》针对公司的内部控制监管，导致银行减少抵押贷款发放，而其他银行填补缺口，其中私人银行向高风险借款人放贷，导致违约率上升。
Abstract We document novel evidence on the spillover effect of a corporate control regulation on local mortgage markets. We find that banks directly targeted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to rectify their internal control weaknesses reduce mortgage originations following the regulation’s enactment. This causes mortgage credit to be reallocated toward other banks in the same local markets: while competing public banks expand lending to safer borrowers, private banks increase lending toward risky applicants. Consequently, loans originated by private banks in spillover counties report higher default rates.