Dual‐class share structure and innovation
研究发现，与具有类似反收购保护的单类股公司相比，双重股权公司中内部人控制权与专利产出、质量、研发效率及CEO创新风险承担正相关，但这种正向效应集中在财务受限公司和高竞争行业，且在IPO后10年内消失，且依赖于创新内部人的存在。
Abstract Using a sample of dual‐class firms matched with single‐class firms possessing similar antitakeover protection, we find a positive association between disproportionate insider control and patent output, quality, creativity, research and development efficiency, and chief executive officer innovative risk taking. We also find, however, that the positive effects of disproportionate control on innovation are concentrated in financially constrained firms and firms in highly competitive industries, and that the positive effects dissipate within 10 years after the initial public offering. Most important, the positive effect of dual‐class structures for innovation is conditional on the presence of innovative insiders in the firm. These findings imply that entrenchment through concentrated control in the hands of uniquely innovative corporate insiders provides a positive environment for innovativeness beyond the entrenchment effects of alternative antitakeover measures.