Board Governance and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price: International Evidence
利用41个国家董事会改革的交错实施作为外生冲击，研究发现改革后投资对股价的敏感性提高约一半，表明加强董事会监督能激励管理者做出更符合企业增长机会的投资决策。
Abstract This article examines the effect of board governance on investment efficiency. I use the staggered enactment of board reforms in 41 countries as a shock to board structure that exogenously improves the quality of board oversight of managers. I find that investment-Q sensitivity improves by roughly half post-reform. This effect is more pronounced for firms that are more exposed to the reforms or when external governance mechanisms are less likely to discipline managers. These findings suggest that increased board oversight strengthens managers’ incentives to make investment decisions that are more in line with their firms’ growth opportunities.