The Central Bank Strikes Back! Credibility of Monetary Policy under Fiscal Influence
研究了独立央行在面临财政压力时的两种货币政策框架，发现加入财政条件能提升央行实现价格稳定的可信度，政府债务水平与结构是关键因素。
Abstract How should independent central banks react if pressured by fiscal policymakers? We contrast the implications of two monetary frameworks: one, where the central bank follows a standard rule aiming exclusively at price stability against the other, where monetary policy additionally leans against fiscal influence. The latter rule improves economic outcomes by providing appropriate incentives to the fiscal authority. More importantly, the additional fiscal conditionality can enhance the credibility of the central bank to achieve price stability. We emphasise how the level and structure of government debt emerge as key factors affecting the credibility of monetary policy with fiscal conditionality.