Screening with Frames: Implementation in Extensive Form
研究委托人如何通过设计多阶段框架来规避激励相容约束，实现合同实施，并应用于垄断筛选问题，发现即使存在天真类型也能完美筛选并提取全部剩余。
Abstract We study a decision-framing design problem: a principal faces an agent with frame-dependent preferences and designs an extensive form with a frame at each stage. This allows the principal to circumvent incentive compatibility constraints by inducing dynamically inconsistent choices of the sophisticated agent. We show that a vector of contracts can be implemented if and only if it can be implemented using a canonical extensive form, which has a simple high–low–high structure using only three stages and the two highest frames, and employs unchosen decoy contracts to deter deviations. We then turn to the study of optimal contracts in the context of the classic monopolistic screening problem and establish the existence of a canonical optimal mechanism, even though our implementability result does not directly apply. In the presence of naive types, the principal can perfectly screen by cognitive type and extract full surplus from naifs.