A Prudential Paradox: The Signal in (Not) Restricting Bank Dividends
研究发现，审慎监管者限制最弱银行的股息，反而诱导边缘银行增加资本支付，银行挤兑风险加剧了通过股息传递信号的动机。最优股息政策在危机中更严格，且信息发布取决于监管者的信息和股息限制政策。
Abstract By restricting dividends in the weakest banks, prudential regulators counterintuitively induce more capital payouts in marginal banks. The potential for bank runs exacerbates the incentive to signal strength through dividend payments. Regulatory restrictions on those payments can be used to achieve the first‐best outcome, but only if the prevailing capital requirements are sufficiently high. In a crisis, the optimal dividend policy is more restrictive, since it allows the weak but solvent banks to pool with the strong. Finally, we show that the optimal release of regulatory bank information depends critically on the regulator's information and dividend restriction policies.