The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
通过实验研究动态讨价还价中双方声誉建设的作用，发现外部选择能减少模仿行为并确保及时达成协议，但前提是参与者对顽固有共同信念；同时外部选择被过度使用，效率并未提高。
We experimentally investigate the role of two-sided reputation-building in dynamic bargaining. In the absence of outside options, rational bargainers have an incentive to imitate obstinate types that are committed to an aggressive demand, inducing delay. Outside options remove this incentive and ensure immediate agreement whenever two rational bargainers match. Our data support the hypothesis that outside options cut down on imitation and ensure timely agreements, but only if subjects share a belief about what constitutes obstinacy. Further, we find that outside options are exercised excessively and that efficiency is no better than it is in their absence. We ascribe this result to the presence of fairness preferences in the subject pool.