Sooner or later? A study of report timing
研究了监管者应如何选择企业报告信息的时间，以平衡激励企业努力和降低债权人清算损失，发现最优报告时间取决于努力效果和项目质量概率。
This study examines the optimal reporting time a regulator should choose for firms to report their information when the firms' effort choices influence the outcome of projects. Our analysis shows that, the regulator's optimal choice of reporting time to maximize overall efficiency is contingent on a trade‐off between motivating a firm's effort to improve the outcome and saving the liquidation value for the creditor to reduce the firm's financing cost. We also find that to induce the firm's effort, the reporting time should be either early enough or late enough—depending on the effectiveness of the effort to turn bad projects into successes. Furthermore, we examine the regulator's optimal choice of reporting time for an economy with heterogenous firms/industries, and we show that the optimal reporting time changes nonmonotonically in the probability of good projects in the economy.