What Is in a Name? Purchases and Sales of Financial Assets as a Monetary Policy Instrument
在一个包含金融部门约束的量化新凯恩斯模型中，研究了最优利率和资产负债表政策，比较了承诺与相机抉择下的政策效果，发现双工具相机抉择政策能消除承诺限制的成本且无通胀偏差。
Abstract This paper studies optimal interest rate and balance sheet policy in a quantitative New Keynesian model with a constrained financial sector, considering commitment versus discretion in monetary policy design and fixing either instrument. Optimal interest rate policy under commitment (discretion) achieves 93.0% (82.6%) of the potential gains to dual instrument monetary policy under commitment. Optimal discretionary dual instrument policy eliminates the cost of commitment limitations and exhibits no inflationary bias. Under commitment, the optimal balance sheet policy eliminates the cost of suboptimal interest rate policy, for example, an interest rate peg. Finally, I compare optimal policies to implementable rules‐based policies.