Investment in the Common Good: Free Rider Effect and the Stability of Mixed Strategy Equilibria
研究发现重复出现的投资机会会延迟公共品投资，而投资者之间投资成本的足够差异可以缓解搭便车效应，对政策制定者通过选择性激励促进企业社会责任投资有参考价值。
The free rider problem is widely observed in investments in the common good. For example, if Best Buy offers corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, such as recycling, tech training, and supplier audit, at its own expense, other firms in the industry can benefit from these programs at no cost (i.e., they become the free riders). Such a free rider effect often manifests itself as a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which potential investors unnecessarily delay their investments. The article “Investment in the common good: Free rider effect and the stability of mixed strategy equilibria” finds that recurring investment opportunities can be a major driver of delays in investment in the common good. It also shows that sufficient heterogeneity in investment cost among potential investors can alleviate the free rider effect. Therefore, the policy makers may try to facilitate investments in public goods (e.g., CSR activities) through some form of selective benefits to potential investors.