A Theory of One-Size-Fits-All Recommendations
研究专家在利益冲突下向两个代理人公开推荐是否采纳政策的现象，发现一刀切推荐即使代理人收益独立也能提供信息，通过隐藏利益冲突增强专家影响力，适用于IMF、世界银行等机构。
One-size-fits-all recommendations are common in many contexts, including those with a widespread heterogeneity. We propose a model that rationalizes this phenomenon. An expert recommends publicly to two agents whether to adopt a policy. The expert is privately informed about agents’ payoffs from the policy and his conflict of interest. We show that one-size-fits-all recommendations can be informative even when payoffs are independent across agents. Such recommendations increase the expert’s influence by concealing his conflict of interest. We apply the model to recommendations provided by the IMF, World Bank, proxy advisory firms, central banks, and the Basel Committee.