CRRA utility and the sustainability of cooperation in infinitely-repeated games
研究了在对称无限重复博弈中，当玩家具有常数相对风险规避（CRRA）效用函数时，维持完全合作所需的关键贴现因子随风险规避系数增加而降低，并应用于国际环境协议的合作条件。
In a symmetric infinitely-repeated game, where players have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), or constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution, utility functions, it is shown that the critical discount factor required to sustain full cooperation is decreasing in the coefficient of relative risk aversion (increasing in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution). An application to cooperation in international environmental agreements (IEA) is presented and it is shown that the limit of the critical discount factor as the number of countries goes to infinity is equal to one (zero) if the coefficient of intertemporal inequality aversion is less (greater) than one.