Accountability and Grand Corruption
构建了一个政治生涯与选举问责模型，分析政治家在不同阶段受贿且选民观察不完美时，晋升预期如何导致晚期行为恶化，并探讨最优激励在遏制低级腐败与改善高级官员选拔之间的权衡。
We propose a model of political careers and electoral accountability in an environment in which politicians may take bribes at different stages of their careers and in which politicians’ actions are only imperfectly observed by voters. We show that the expectation of promotion to higher office may motivate some politicians to behave worse at the latest stages of their careers, setting off a trade-off between providing incentives for good behavior at lower levels of office and selecting better politicians for higher office. Optimal rewards focus either on stamping out corruption at lower levels of office or on improving selection for higher office.