Games Played by Teams of Players
构建了一个分析团队博弈的通用框架，其中同一团队成员获得相同收益，结合非合作博弈与集体选择理论，定义了团队均衡并研究其向纳什均衡收敛的条件，以及集体选择规则使团队决策随机最优的条件。
We develop a general framework for analyzing games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines noncooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic form and extensive form games. We introduce the concept of team equilibrium and identify conditions under which it converges to Nash equilibrium with large teams. We identify conditions on collective choice rules such that team decisions are stochastically optimal: the probability the team chooses an action is increasing in its equilibrium expected payoff. The theory is illustrated with some binary action games.