The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games
实验发现，在无限重复囚徒困境中，顺序决策相比同时决策能大幅提高合作率，尤其是在中等合作激励下，合作率提升约40个百分点。
Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that sequential play reduces strategic uncertainty. We show in an experiment that this has large consequences for behavior. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases the cooperation rate by around 40 percentage points, whereas with very low or very high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or very high in both settings.