Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment
利用中国两家政府债券发行机构的大规模拍卖实验数据，研究统一价格与歧视性价格拍卖机制对国债收益率和国库收入的影响，发现两种机制无显著差异。
This paper exploits a large-scale auction experiment conducted by two Chinese government treasury security issuers—the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank—to investigate whether treasury securities should be sold through uniform price or discriminatory price auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. Further, these estimates indicate there is no significant economic difference in terms of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different bond yield-rate measurements and participation behavior.