Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice
研究了当选项无法按左右轴排序时，议会和委员会如何通过树形议程进行投票，证明策略投票与真诚投票一致，并通过两个案例展示实证含义。
We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a “left-right” axis. Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be designed? We assume that preferences are single peaked on a tree and study convex agendas where, at each stage in the voting process, the tree of remaining alternatives is divided into two subtrees that are subjected to a Yes-No vote. We show that strategic voting coincides with sincere, unsophisticated voting. Based on inference results and revealed preference arguments, we illustrate the empirical implications for two case studies.