Sequential Screening with Type-Enhancing Investment
在采购的序贯筛选模型中引入第一阶段类型增强的隐藏投资，发现凸投资成本下分配扭曲必然缓解，线性成本下投资足够有效时采购成本最小化要求社会效率。
Due to the well-known efficiency–rent extraction trade-off, the optimal mechanism in a pure screening environment (e.g., revenue maximization in auctions or cost minimization in procurement) typically calls for distortions in allocative efficiency when agents possess private information at the time of contracting. In this paper we introduce first-stage type-enhancing hidden investment to a standard sequential screening model of procurement, and find that (i) with convex investment cost, mitigation of allocative distortion must arise; and (ii) such mitigation can even be extreme with linear investment cost—procurement cost minimization must require social efficiency when the investment is sufficiently effective.