Gerrymandering in State Legislatures: Frictions from Axiomatic Bargaining
将党派选区划分重新表述为控制地图的政党现任代表之间的谈判博弈，发现现状是威胁点，解释了为何变化通常很小；高度竞争的选区如果已由执政党代表，会从选区划分中获得更多帮助。
Theories of partisan redistricting postulate unitary actors maximizing their party’s expected seat share. Yet, the partition of a fixed supply of friendly voters necessarily implies a tragedy of the commons. We recast partisan redistricting as a bargaining game among the sitting representatives of the party controlling the map. The status quo is the threat point, explaining why changes are frequently minor. This bargaining framework implies that highly competitive districts will receive more help from redistricting if they are already represented by the party in charge. Employing a regression discontinuity design with precinct-level data, we find support for this prediction.