Mandatory Energy Efficiency Disclosure in Housing Markets
研究了要求卖房者提供住宅能效认证审计的政策效果，发现该政策提高了能效的价格溢价并鼓励节能投资，支持了在信息对称不完全的情况下披露政策能改善市场结果。
Mandatory disclosure policies are implemented broadly despite sparse evidence that they improve market outcomes. We study the effects of requiring home sellers to provide buyers with certified audits of residential energy efficiency. Using similar nearby homes as a comparison group, we find that this requirement increases price premiums for energy efficiency and encourages energy-saving investments. We additionally present evidence highlighting the market failure—incomplete information by both buyers and sellers—that prevents widespread voluntary disclosure of energy efficiency in housing transactions. Our findings support that disclosure policies can improve market outcomes in settings with symmetrically incomplete information.