On the Disclosure of Half-Truths and the Duty to Update
研究了经理人在被禁止或允许披露半真话时，其自愿披露政策如何变化，以及更新义务对披露的影响。发现禁止半真话会促使经理人披露更多信息，而更新义务则使经理人随时间披露更多信息。
We develop a model of a manager’s equilibrium voluntary disclosure policy to study how that policy changes depending on whether the manager is prohibited from disclosing, or allowed to disclose, a half-truth; we also examine how the disclosure policy changes depending on whether the manager has a duty to update past disclosures. Among our results, we show that if a manager is prohibited from issuing half-truths, the manager discloses a wider array of information than if the manager is allowed to issue half-truths, and investors view the absence of disclosure more skeptically; we also show that imposing a duty to update on the manager does not affect the manager’s initial disclosures, but it results in the manager disclosing uniformly more information over time. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.