Public pension policy and the equity–efficiency trade‐off∗
通过一般均衡代际交叠模型，比较了再分配型（贝弗里奇）和收入关联型（俾斯麦）养老金制度对公平与效率的影响，发现俾斯麦制度反而可能降低收入不平等，但会挤出人力资本。
Abstract This paper illustrates that the equity–efficiency trade‐off between a redistributive, Beveridgean, pension system and an earnings‐based, Bismarckian, scheme can collapse when accounting for labor supply effects on the extensive margins. I introduce a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with endogenous savings, human capital formation, and labor supply. The model is calibrated to an average OECD economy. The results suggest that allocating funds towards a Bismarckian pension system always reduces earnings inequality – and, in some cases, lifetime inequality – when compared with a Beveridgean scheme. However, the Bismarckian scheme crowds out more human capital in the economy following a higher steady‐state interest rate.