Reaching out to affluent interest groups? Assessing the moderating role of membership influence across old and new democracies
研究了政策制定者主动联系利益集团的条件，发现富裕集团更易被联系，但仅在成员对集团政治立场有强影响力时成立，且这一模式在新民主国家中不显著。
Abstract This paper seeks to explain under which conditions policymakers actively reach out to interest groups. Policymakers are often expected to contact affluent groups more often than resource‐strapped ones because these organizations can provide them with more and better policy expertise. I argue that economic resources are less important than often assumed and expect that the role of financial means in enjoying outreach from policymakers is contingent on the degree of membership influence. To test this argument empirically, I rely on survey data of over 2.500 interest groups active in six European countries varying in democratic maturity. The results demonstrate that wealthy groups are contacted more frequently than economically deprived ones, but only when members exert a strong influence over the group's political positioning. This is true except for relatively new democracies where the effect of economic resources does not vary systematically across differential levels of membership influence.