Dynamic pricing in the presence of strategic consumers with ‘experience-in-store-and-buy-online’
研究了全渠道零售商在允许消费者线下体验后线上购买（ESBO）时，动态定价与策略型消费者行为的互动，发现允许首期体验可提高零售商利润并减少消费者延迟购买。
Experience-in-store-and-buy-online (ESBO) is a popular omni-channel strategy. This paper studies the effects of inspection service provision on the interactions of a dynamic-pricing retailer and strategic consumers, i.e., the effects of the ESBO initiative on store operations. Selling a seasonal product over two periods, the omni-channel retailer may allow consumers to inspect this product offline only in the first period (first-period inspection) or in both periods (two-period inspection). First, we find that allowing first-period inspection makes the retailer better off. The retailer will price the product higher in the first period but probably lower in the second period. Even so, more consumers will purchase in the first period: that is, allowing first-period inspection can somewhat deter strategic deferral. Meanwhile, the seemingly negative intertemporal showrooming behavior (i.e., inspect the product offline in the first period but defer online purchase to the second period) benefits the retailer. Compared to first-period inspection, allowing two-period inspection increases the retailer’s prices in both periods as well as profit, provided that inspection is definitely available in the second period. On the other hand, when inspection is possible in the second period, it may be profitable to allow inspection only in the first period..