Minority versus majority: The choice of acquisition in Asia‐Pacific countries
研究了收购方财务约束如何影响其选择少数股权还是多数股权收购，发现财务约束越强越倾向少数股权，且政治稳定和媒体自由会降低国际收购方选择少数股权的可能性。
Abstract This paper examines the relationship between the financial constraints of the acquiring firms and their choice of a minority over a majority acquisition. Our findings show that the likelihood of bidders undertaking a minority acquisition increases with financial constraints, including the deviation from target capital structure, and overleverage deficit. We also find that the impacts of leverage deviation on the likelihood of bidders engaging in a minority or majority acquisition is asymmetric for underleveraged and overleveraged firms. In addition, international bidders are less likely to take a minority acquisition if the target is operating in (i) countries with a higher degree of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, (ii) countries with higher degree to which individuals are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as having more freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Lastly, minority acquisitions are more common in a country with a more developed market. As such, in a fluid social order it looks like acquirers really need majority control.